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I. INTRODUCTION

Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and equivalent state court rules prohibit the
introduction of subsequent remedial measures for the purpose of demonstrating
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negligence, culpable conduct, or product defect.' The rule breaks down, however,
in application and purpose, when a defendant undertakes a new safety measure
after the plaintiff's injury but before the defendant had knowledge of the loss.
Such a situation is not uncommon. Would-be defendants frequently improve their
products and product safety, whether in response to injuries incurred by other
users, business pressures, or simply advances in the state of the art and scientific
knowledge. Toxic exposure cases, where exposure often predates diagnosis of the
injury by a decade or more, represent a prime and growing example of cases
where defendants are likely to have made significant product or warning
improvements which, if taken before the plaintiff's exposure, may have
prevented the injury. Even traditional products liability cases encounter this
problem. For example, a manufacturer of industrial equipment may introduce a
guard to a machine simply to make the product more competitive with other
models without knowledge that plaintiff John Doe injured himself the week
before on the old, unguarded machine. Should evidence that the machine now
comes with a guard be admissible?
The literal text of Rule 407 suggests not. Yet allowing such measures into
evidence may not have the same chilling effect as when the measure was taken in
response to the plaintiffs injury. In such circumstances, it can be argued the
defendant never feared the measure would be used against it. Since the policies
behind Rule 407 may not support the exclusion of such evidence, should the rule
still be applied?
This article explores Rule 407, its policy underpinnings, courts' differing
interpretations of the rule, and how the rule should be applied to defendants who
take subsequent remedial measures without knowledge of a plaintiffs injury.
Finally, this article suggests an interpretation of and amendment to Rule 407 that
clarifies the rule and furthers its policy bases.
II. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE EXCLUSION
OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES

A. Early Developments
The genesis of the subsequent remedial measures rule is a decision from an
English court in 1869.2 This rule was first rejected by American courts but
eventually adopted by almost every state.3 In 1883, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that evidence of a defendant's repairs to an allegedly defective switch was

1.

FED. R. EVID. 407.

2.
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EVIDENCE § 5282 (Supp. 2006) (citing Hart v. Lancanshire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R. (N.S.) 261 (1869)).

3.
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inadmissible to prove negligence. Subsequent remedial measures, the court
explained, were not indicative of negligent conduct.5 The court reasoned:
A person may have exercised all the care which the law required, and yet
in the light of his new experience, after an unexpected accident has
occurred, and as a measure of extreme caution, he may adopt additional
safeguards. The more careful a person is, the more regard he has for the
lives of others, the more likely he would be to do so, and it would seem
unjust that he could not do so without being liable to have such acts
construed as an admission of prior negligence. We think such a rule puts
an unfair interpretation upon human conduct, and virtually holds out an
6
inducementfor continued negligence.
By 1892, the United States Supreme Court had weighed in and held that a
subsequent alteration or repair by a defendant is not competent evidence of
negligence. In Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad Co. v. Hawthorne, the
plaintiff sued a saw-mill owner for damages he suffered when a pulley fell on
him." The plaintiff claimed the saw-mill owner was negligent for not properly
designing the machinery.9 To prove negligence, the plaintiff introduced evidence
that the saw-mill owner changed the machinery after the accident to keep the
pulleys from falling.' ° The Court noted some difference of opinion amongst state
courts on the issue of subsequent remedial measures but determined that most
states found such evidence inadmissible." The Court further reasoned that the
two states that did admit such evidence, Pennsylvania and Kansas, did so without
"satisfactory reasons.""
Rule 308 of the Model Code of Evidence, approved in 1942, first codified the
inadmissibility of subsequent remedial measures. 3 The model rule provided:
Evidence of the taking of a precaution by a person to prevent the
repetition of a previous harm or the occurrence of a similar harm or
evidence of the adoption of a plan requiring that such a precaution be

4. Morse v. Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 358,359 (Minn. 1883).
5. Id.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 206-07 (1892).
8. Id. at202.
9. Id. at 202-03.
10. ld. at 203.
11. Id. at 207.
12. Id.
13. Michael W. Blanton, Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 in Strict Products Liability Cases:
The Evidence Weighs Against Automatic Exclusion, 65 UMKC L. REV. 49, 55 (1996).
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taken is inadmissible as tending to prove that his failure
to take such a
4
negligent.
was
harm
previous
the
prevent
to
precaution
Later, Uniform Rule of Evidence 51 was promulgated and stated, "[w]hen
after the occurrence of an event remedial or precautionary measures are taken,
which, if taken previously would have tended to make the event less likely to
occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event."' 5 This rule
eventually served as a model for the first part of Rule 407.16
Before Rule 407 was adopted, Missouri proposed its own evidence code,
which contained a provision concerning subsequent remedial measures but also
contained exceptions to the general rule. 7 The exception to the proposed
Missouri rule provided:
Nothing in [the general rule] shall be construed to render inadmissible
evidence of such subsequent remedial conduct when such evidence is
relevant for purposes other than to prove prior negligence or other
culpable conduct, as for example, but not exclusively, (1) to prove duty,
ownership or control, if denied, or (2) to prove the feasibility or
practicability, if denied,
of remedial conduct at the time of or prior to the
8
involved.
occurrence
These exceptions later formed the basis for the second sentence of Rule 407.' 9
B. Rule 407
From these common law developments and in an effort to adopt a uniform
evidence code, Congress initially approved Rule 407, which stated:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another

14.

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE R. 308 (1942).

15.

UNIF. R. EVID. 51 (1953).

16.

Blanton, supra note 13, at 55-56 (citing 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
§ 5281 (1980)).
WRIGHT& GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5281.
Id. § 5281 n.12.
Blanton, supra note 13, at 56; see also Shelton v. S. Ry., 139 S.E. 232, 234 (N.C. 1927) (listing
law exceptions to the inadmissibility of subsequent remedial measures).
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17.
18.
19.
common
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purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 0
Rule 407 remained unchanged until 1997, when Congress amended the rule
to create two major changes. Rule 407 now reads:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures
are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm
less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product,
a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.2 '
The two major changes in the 1997 Amendment were (1) the relevant time
period during which the subsequent remedial measures were taken changed from
"after an event" to "after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event" and (2)
subsequent remedial measures could no longer be used to demonstrate product
defects.22 The first change was meant to clarify that Rule 407 only applies to
changes made after a plaintiff is injured, rather than after a defendant engages in
its allegedly tortious conduct. 23 The reason for this change was the belief "that
manufacturers [would not] be discouraged from making repairs when an accident
[had] not yet occurred., 24 The second change expanded the application of Rule
407 to strict liability actions, which some courts rejected.25 While the latter
amendment has been well-covered in existing legal scholarship 26 and falls beyond
the scope of this article, the former change is relevant to the problem at hand.
Most states have subsequent remedial measure rules that are identical or
substantially similar to the federal rule,27 while others differ only in expressly
20. FED. R. EVID. 407 (1975) (superseded in 1997).
21. Id. (emphasis added to highlight changes).
22. Id. advisory committee's note (1997). The authors include failure to warn or instruct within the
category of product defects.
23. Id.
24. See Thais L. Richardson, The ProposedAmendment to FederalRule of Evidence 407: A Subsequent
Remedial Measure That Does Not Fix The Problem, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1475 (1996).
25. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (1997). See generally Blanton, supra note 13, at 61-80;
Thomas C. Fincham, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and Its State Variations: The Courts Perform Some
"Subsequent Remedial Measures" of Their Own in Products Liability Cases, 49 UMKC L. REV. 338, 341-47
(1981).
26. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures
Under Rule 407 of FederalRules of Evidence, 158 A.L.R. FED. 609 §§ 3[a]-[b] (1999); Blanton, supra note 13;
Richardson, supra note 24, at 1466-68; Randolph L. Bums, Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures and Strict
ProductsLiability: A New-Relevant-Answer to an Old Problem, 81 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1995).
27. A majority of states retain the 1974 version of the subsequent remedial measures rule. ALA. R.
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providing that the doctrine does not apply in strict liability cases.28 A minority of
to Rule 407 and instead
jurisdictions have not codified a rule of evidence parallel
• 29
rely on their common law as a source for the doctrine.
The last sentence in Rule 407 provides several exceptions to the subsequent
remedial measures rule.3 ° These exceptions play an important role in the

application of the rule and it has been argued that the rule is actually a rule of
inclusion except when such evidence is offered for a very narrow purpose."

III. POLICY REASONS UNDERLYING RULE 407
Three distinct grounds support the subsequent remedial measures rule. The
first is that subsequent remedial measures are irrelevant to proving negligence,
culpable conduct, or product defects.32 The second is a social policy consideration
encouraging individuals, companies, and other entities to take remedial measures
to prevent further injuries.33 The third, an alternative to the first, is that although
the evidence may be relevant, its admission would be more prejudicial than
probative.34 A look at case law and the Advisory Committee Notes demonstrates
the relative importance and usefulness of these grounds.

EVID. 407; ARIZ. R. EVID. 407; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-41-101, R. 407 (2005); COLO. R. EVID. 407; DEL. R.

EVID. 407; IND. R. EvID. 407 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-451 (2006); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 407 (2007);
MD. RULE 5-407; MICH. R. EVID. 407; MINN. R. EVID. 407; Miss. R. EVID. 407; MONT. CODE ANN., CH. 10, R.
407 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.095 (2007); N.H. R. EVID. 407; N.M. R. EVID. 11-407; N.C. GEN. STAT. §
8C-1, R. 407 (2006); OHIO R. EVID. 407; OKLA. STAT. tit 12, § 2407 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.185 (2005);
R.I. R. EVID. 407; S.C. R. EVID. 407; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-12-9 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-418.1
(West 2007); WASH. R. EVID. 407; W.VA. R. EVID. 407; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.07 (West 2006). A minority of
states have updated their evidence codes to reflect the 1997 amendment. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.407 (West
2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1406 (2005); KY. R. EVID. 407; ME. R. EVID. 407; N.D. R. EVID. 407; PA. R.
EVID. 407; TENN. R. EVID. 407; TEX. R. EVID. 407; UTAH R. EVID. 407; VT. R. EVID. 407.
28. See CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 4-7; HAW. R. EVID. 407; IOWA R. EVID. 5.407.
29. Boggs v. Lay, 164 S.W.3d 4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Royals v. Ga. Peace Officer Standards & Training
Council, 474 S.E.2d 220 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Niemann v. Luca, 625 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995);
Stevens v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 69 N.E. 338 (Mass. 1904); Hodges v. Percival, 23 N.E. 423 (Ill. 1890).
30. FED. R. EvID. 407.
31. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5282. The exceptions to Rule 407 are not explored in this
article. For further elaboration of the exceptions, see Robert K. Harris, The Impeachment Exception to Rule 407:
Limitations on the Introduction of Evidence of Subsequent Measures, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 901 (1988)
(discussing impeachment); Kimberly Eberwine, Note, Hindsight Bias and the Subsequent Remedial Measures
Rule: Fixing the Feasibility Exception, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 633 (2005) (discussing feasibility).
32. Eric L. Vinson, Applying FederalRule of Evidence 407 in Strict Liability: A Discussion of Changes
to the Rule, 16 REV. LrrIG. 773, 779-80 (1997).
33. ld. at 780.
34. Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516, 522 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
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A. The Courts
The Minnesota Supreme Court discussed two of the grounds in Morse v.
Minneapolis & Saint Louis Railway." The Morse court concluded that when a
person gets into an accident, it is consistent with the exercise of reasonable care
for that person to adopt additional safeguards to prevent further accidents, and
thus such action is irrelevant to prove negligence.36 At no point was this
individual negligent or otherwise at fault.37 The adoption of additional safeguards
was consistent with reasonable care rather than negligence. 38 The Morse court
also recognized the public policy concern that admitting evidence of subsequent
remedial measures "virtually holds out an inducement for continued
negligence."39
Almost a century later, the California Supreme Court, in Ault v. International
Harvester Co., also recognized the dual purpose of excluding evidence of
subsequent remedial measures.4° The Ault court reasoned that California's
subsequent remedial measures rule "originally rested on the notion that such
repairs were completely irrelevant to the issue of [the] defendant's negligence at
the time of the accident.""' In addition, the Ault court recognized that "courts and
legislatures have frequently retained the exclusionary rule in negligence cases as
a matter of 'public policy,' reasoning that the exclusion of such evidence may be
necessary to avoid deterring individuals
from making improvements or repairs
42
after an accident has occurred.,
Despite the dual purposes described in Morse and Ault, some courts have
relied exclusively on the relevancy basis for excluding evidence of subsequent
remedial measures. 43 In Grenada Steel Industries v. Alabama Oxygen Co., the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's decision to exclude evidence of
subsequent remedial measures taken after an acetylene gas leak resulted in an
explosion." The Grenada Steel court acknowledged that some courts rely on the
policy basis for excluding subsequent remedial measures, but explained it was
basing its decision instead "on the proposition that evidence of subsequent repair
or change has little relevance to whether the product in question was defective at
some previous time. '' -

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Morse v. Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1883).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Cal. 1974).
Id. (citing Sappenfield v. Main St. & A.P.R. Co., 27 P. 590, 593 (1891)).
Id.
Bums, supra note 26, at 1166.
Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Ala. Oxygen Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 883, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 887.
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As an alternative to the relevance ground, a third basis courts use to exclude
evidence of subsequent remedial measures is that such evidence would be more
prejudicial than probative.46 Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence
of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without that evidence. 7 As pointed out by the court in
Troja v. Black & Decker Manufacturing, "[i]n theory, evidence of any
subsequent modification may be relevant, because the inference could be drawn
that the product was defective before the manufacturer implemented the remedial
measures."4 8 However, just because evidence may be relevant is not the end of
the inquiry. 9 If the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, then it is inadmissible, even if relevant." This third
policy was also recognized by the Supreme Court in Columbia & Puget Sound
Railroad Co. v. Hawthorne, where the Court held that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures "had no legitimate tendency to prove that the defendant had
been negligent before the accident happened, and is calculated to distract the
minds of the jury from the real issue, and to create a prejudice against the
defendant."5'
As explained more fully below, the courts' interpretations of the subsequent
remedial measures rule and their explanations of its underlying policy play an
important role in how the courts apply the rule to those situations not falling
neatly within its bounds 2 However, it is also worthwhile to examine the
Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 407 as we explore the underpinnings of the
rule.
B. Advisory Committee Notes
The Advisory Committee's 1972 Notes accompanying Rule 407 indicate that
Congress was adopting the common law's subsequent remedial measures rule.53

The Advisory Committee also noted that Rule 407 rests on two grounds.54 First,
subsequent remedial measures are not "an admission, since the [remedial
measure] is equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through

46. Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516, 522 (1985); see also Krause v. Am. Aerolights,
Inc., 762 P.2d 1011, 1015-16 (Or. 1988) ("Perhaps the best rationale for the application of the rule is that triers
of fact, particularly juries, may overreact to evidence of subsequent remedial measures.").
47.

See FED. R. EVID. 401.

48.
49.

Troja, 488 A.2d at 522.
Bums, supra note 26, at 1166.

50.

FED. R. EVID. 403.

51. Columbia & P. S. R.R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202,207 (1892) (emphasis added).
52. See infra Part IV.
53. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (1975) ("The rule incorporates conventional
doctrine ...").
54. Id.
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contributory negligence."" "Put another way, the exclusion of subsequent
remedial measures rejects the suggested inference that such measures are an
admission of fault and that they are therefore relevant to proving fault. 5 6 This
echoes the relevancy rationale as explained in Morse.57 Despite the long-standing
relevancy basis, the Advisory Committee found that this alone was not sufficient
to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures.58
The Advisory Committee's second ground in support of Rule 407
acknowledged the social policy basis for excluding evidence of subsequent
remedial measures. 9 The Advisory Committee stated that social policy should
encourage individuals "to take, or at least not discourag[e] them from taking,
steps in furtherance of added safety. ' '60 Between the two justifications for Rule
407, the Advisory Committee said the social policy rationale was a "more
impressive" ground.6'

Interestingly, the Advisory Committee did not find that the prejudicial effect
outweighing the probative value was a rationale supporting the exclusion of
subsequent remedial measures. 62 The Committee noted that, even if the evidence
were admitted under one of the exceptions, "factors of undue prejudice,
confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and waste of time remain for
consideration under Rule 403. ' '63 Thus, although Rule 403 may be used to
exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures, its application is merely a
final attempt to exclude such evidence after it falls outside the exclusionary scope
of Rule 407. This comment appeared again in the Advisory Committee's Notes
following the 1997 Amendment. 64
IV. A

TEMPORAL PROBLEM AND TWO SOLUTIONS

Just as abandoning the doctrine of subsequent remedial measures would
"virtually hold[] out an inducement for continued negligence, 65 so too do the
lingering questions of its application. One such question is whether the
defendant's "remedial measure" must necessarily come after it has notice of the
55. Id.
56. Bums, supra note 26, at 1148.
57. See Morse v. Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1883); see also supra
text accompanying notes 4-6, 36-38 (describing the Morse rationale).
58. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (1975) ("Under a liberal theory of relevancy this
ground alone would not support exclusion as the inference is still a possible one.").
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (1997) ("Evidence of subsequent measures that is not
barred by Rule 407 may still be subject to exclusion on Rule 403 grounds when the dangers of prejudice or
confusion substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.").
65. Morse v. Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1883).
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plaintiff's injury, or is it sufficient that the measure be taken after the harm?
Certainly, in most cases, the distinction is without a difference. Defendants often
would not undertake a remedial measure but for a plaintiff's injury, and even if a
defendant were contemplating a safety improvement before the harm, there is a
good chance it will learn of the plaintiff's injury at or near the time of the injurycausing event. But this is not always the case.
Defendants make safety improvements for a variety of reasons, not simply in
response to accidents. Prudent would-be defendants also improve the safety of
their products or property as part of general improvements or to prevent accidents
from happening in the first place. These improvements are part of the ordinary
course of business. When they occur before a plaintiff's accident, they are
admissible, but not troublesome, because a jury is likely to find evidence of any
improvements before the accident to be a sign that the defendant exercised
reasonable care. When improvements are in reaction to a plaintiffs accident,
their admissibility is limited by Rule 407 and its state law progeny, and their
exclusion or admissibility can be justified for the policy reasons discussed
above.66
What should be the result if the defendant improves its warning, its product,
or its property before it has knowledge of the accident, but after the plaintiffs
injury? Admitting such evidence is far less likely to discourage safety
improvements because the person making the improvement does not know of the
plaintiff's injuries, and therefore, is unlikely to anticipate a lawsuit at all.67
Although after making the improvement the prospective defendant believes the
chances of an accident are reduced, it still
the potential for litigation
•• appreciates
68
as preventative measures are not infallible. However, as far as the potential
defendant knows, no accidents have taken place yet, and therefore, it believes
that any improvements it takes will only be seen as prudent and cautious. In this
scenario, there is no risk of discouraging safety improvements. Still, a literal
reading of Rule 407 suggests the doctrine of subsequent remedial measures
would bar the admissibility of the improvement.
But that is not the last of it. Certainly, evidence that a defendant was
considering making an improvement before gaining knowledge of a plaintiff's
injury is relevant to show whether the failure to make the improvement earlier
was reasonable. Indeed, can a defendant's improvement be "remedial" at all if
not made with the intent to remedy the conditions which led to a plaintiff's harm?
Does this matter? Ultimately, would a decision on these questions have a chilling

66. See supra Part III.
67. Cf Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing why a
defendant's decision to make a safety improvement is admissible if that decision was made prior to plaintiffs
injury).
68. For example, after placing a warning label on its product a manufacturer does not believe lawsuits
alleging negligence and strict liability will vanish. The manufacturer is aware that lawsuits may continue to be
filed despite its efforts to improve its product.

662
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effect on a would-be defendant's willingness to improve its warning, product, or
property?
These queries are not entirely rhetorical. With the rise of toxic tort litigation,
in which defendants may not learn of a plaintiffs injury until decades after
exposure, these questions become all the more important. Solutions from existing
case law are varied both in reasoning and result. Some courts have adopted a
literal approach to this problem, trying to adhere to the text of Rule 407 to solve
this dilemma.69 However, this literal approach has its own variations in how
closely the text is read. Meanwhile, other courts have adopted a policy-based
approach to determine how to interpret Rule 407. Under the policy approach,
courts look at whether the underlying policies of the rule justify a given result.
A. Solution #1-The Literalist (and Quasi-Literalist)Approach
The first possible resolution to this dilemma is to read Rule 407 literally and
follow its terms. But this method of interpreting Rule 407 can be used to justify
either position. On the one hand, Rule 407 is titled "Subsequent Remedial
Measures," and it has been argued that a measure is not remedial if it is not taken
in reaction to a specific injury or event. 70 Therefore, notice of the injury, or at
least the event causing the injury, would be required. On the other hand, Rule
407 may be read to apply whenever a measure is taken "after an injury or harm
allegedly caused by an event."'', There is little doubt that a literal reading of the
first sentence of Rule 407 does not require notice to the defendant. 72 Still, courts
have used the plain text of Rule 407 on both sides of this debate.
In Van Gordon v. Portland General Electric Co., the Oregon Supreme Court
"literally" interpreted its subsequent remedial measures rule and held that the
doctrine did not bar evidence of a remedial measure taken before the defendant
received notice of plaintiffs injury. 73 In that case, a two-year-old child was injured
by scalding water on May 20, 1978, when he slipped and fell into a hot spring.74
The plaintiff alleged the defendant property owner had been reckless in failing to
warn visitors to the hot springs of the possible danger of extremely hot water and
that the defendant had knowledge of the danger before the accident.75 At the time of
the plaintiffs accident, the defendant maintained three signs reading "HOT
WATER." 76 Four months after the accident, but two months before learning of it,
69. See supra Part IV.A.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 73-84; see also Trytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715 (7th Cir.
1994) (arguing that measures taken must be subsequent and remedial); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2,
§ 5285 (stating that the "event" referenced in Rule 407 must "trigger[] the remedial measure.").
71.

See FED. R. EvID. 407.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id.
Van Gordon v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 693 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Or. 1985).
Id. at 1287.
Id.
Id. at 1288.
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the defendant replaced those signs with new warnings which stated: "CAUTION
HOT WATER SOME WATER & ROCK TEMPERATURE IN THIS AREA
ARE HIGH ENOUGH TO CAUSE BURNS" and "ACTIVITIES
OF CHILDREN
77
CLOSELY.,
MONITORED
BE
& PETS SHOULD
Justice Jones, writing the unanimous en banc opinion, applied Oregon's subsequent remedial measures rule to allow the admission of the new signs into evidence."
Justice Jones determined that the doctrine of subsequent remedial measures could not
be applied when the measure was not taken to specifically remedy the plaintiff's
accident.7 9 In so holding, Jones wrote, "the so-called 'subsequent remedial measures'
rule does not apply because there was no evidence presented by the plaintiff or [the
defendant] that these new signs were erected because of the injury to the plaintiff."80
Rather, the court held, measures must "reflect hindsight gained from the ...
accident."8' Interestingly, Justice Jones justified this application on textual grounds
by relying on "the plain language of the rule" and an unpacked understanding of the
word "after. 8 2 Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court "literally" read the doctrine of
subsequent remedial measures to require that the measures taken be a specific
response to the plaintiff's accident.83 Therefore, the Van Gordon rule is that "a
defendant must know of the prior event in order to fashion a safety measure to
remedy any hazard that caused the event." 84
This "literal" interpretation of Rule 407 and the doctrine of subsequent remedial
measures ignores various issues including the definition of "remedial" and whether
the measure must be "remedial" at all under Rule 407 or its state equivalents,
including the Oregon rule. It is worth noting that the word "remedial" does not
appear in the body of Rule 407.5 Further, even if the measure must be "remedial," it
is not clear whether such a requirement demands that a defendant's actions be taken
in reaction to a plaintiff's injury or even the event causing the injury. A standard
definition of "remedial"--"[i]ntended to correct, remove, or lessen a wrong, fault, or
defect"-requires only knowledge of a defect, not knowledge that the defect has
caused an injury. 816 The Van Gordon rule skips several steps in reaching its
conclusion, including a leap over the definition of "remedial." Practically speaking, a

77. Id.
78. Id. at 1288-90. Oregon's Rule of Evidence 407, mirroring the federal rule, had not been adopted at
the time of the plaintiffs accident. However, the court noted that both rules "merely restate[] decisional law in
Oregon," and therefore, facilitated their discussion of the doctrine of subsequent remedial measures. Id. at 1288.
79. Id. at 1290.
80. Id. at 1289.
81. id. at 1290.
82. Id. at 1289-90.
83. Cf WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5285. "Rule 407 only applies when the remedial measure is
offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct 'in connection with the event.' The reference is to the event
that triggeredthe remedial measure." Id. (emphasis added).
84. Van Gordon, 693 P.2d at 1289.
85. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
86. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1319 (8th ed. 2004).
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defendant need not know of a prior accident or injury to fashion a safety measure to
remedy a hazard; the defendant need only know of the hazard itself (e.g., the scalding
hot water or the lack of a guard on a machine). Although Van Gordon holds itself out
as a case applying a literalist approach, it should, more properly, be categorized as a
quasi-literalist approach.
The better-reasoned literalist approach more strictly adheres to the text of
Rule 407 itself. In its current form, Rule 407 applies "[w]hen, after an injury or
harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously,
would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur . . . ,17Strictly reading
this text, evidence of a subsequent measure is inadmissible if the measure could
have prevented the injury,88 regardless of whether it was taken in response to the
injury or was intended to prevent similar injuries. In other words, a defendant
need not know of the injury-causing event or the hazard that caused it so long as
the measure could have cured the hazard. Under this approach, the "subsequent"
requirement is met whenever the measure is taken after the injury or harm. This
strict-literalist approach more closely follows the text of Rule 407 than the quasiliteralist approach of Van Gordon.
The Seventh Circuit followed this strict-literalist approach in Kaczmarek v.
Allied Chemical Corporation.9 In Kaczmarek, the plaintiff truck driver was
injured when a hose connecting his tank trailer to a receiving tank broke loose
from its intake valve and squirted sulfuric acid on his leg and groin. 90 "The
district court refused to admit evidence that after the accident [the defendant]
replaced the coupling on its hoses with a different and perhaps safer one." 9'
Although the coupling replacement occurred after the defendant had knowledge
of the plaintiff's injury, Kaczmarek is useful because the defendant's decision to
replace the coupling occurred before the injury. 92 Because the decision to fix the
existing problem was made before the plaintiff's injury took place, and thus
before the defendant had knowledge of the injury, its similarity to Van Gordon is
evident. Although Van Gordon and Kaczmarek raise slightly different questions,
the approach in Kaczmarek is nonetheless instructive, as the defendants in both
cases decided to remedy the existing problem before they knew of the plaintiffs'
injuries. In addition, the underlying policies for Rule 407 are arguably not
furthered in either case.
In Kaczmarek, Judge Posner, writing for the panel, refused to budge from his
plain reading of Rule 407, holding: "[a]lthough a fair argument can thus be made

87.

FED. R. EVID. 407.

88. Although the text of Rule 407 requires that the measure "would have made the injury or harm less
likely to occur," this is equivalent to "could have prevented." Rule 407 does not require the measure to have
absolutely prevented the injury; it only requires a lessening of the likelihood. See id.
89. 836 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987).
90. Id. at 1056.
91. Id. at 1060.
92. Id.
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that Rule 407 should not apply to a case such as this where the remedial measure
is adopted pursuant to a decision taken before the accident, we are unwilling to
carve out an exception for this case., 93 Although clearly interested in the policy
implications in cases where the decision to make a remedial measure is made
before the defendant has notice of the plaintiff's injury, Posner held to a literal
reading of the rule.94 In particular, he wrote:
There is nothing wrong with a court's interpolating an exception into a
statute or rule when necessary to serve the draftsmen's purposes; it is
done all the time. But the considerations pro and con [sic] exception
sought in this case are too closely balanced for us to want to complicate
the administration of Rule 407 by creating such an exception to its
refreshingly lapidary prose.95
As Van Gordon and Kaczmarek demonstrate, courts that agree on a literal
interpretation of Rule 407 may, nevertheless, disagree as to its application where
a remedial measure is undertaken before the defendant has knowledge of the
plaintiff's injury. The Oregon Supreme Court in Van Gordon determined that,
because the subsequent measure must be "remedial," it must be in specific
response to the plaintiffs accident. 96 Therefore, Rule 407 cannot apply to
measures taken where defendant is without notice of the accident.97 Meanwhile,
the Seventh Circuit in Kaczmarek literally construed the first sentence of Rule
407 and held that the rule applies whenever the measure is undertaken after the
plaintiff's accident, even in a case where absolutely no policy interest justifies
the exclusion.9" However, Judge Posner's reference to a "fair argument" that Rule
407 should not apply in such cases implies the boundaries of Rule 407 may not
be etched in stone. 99

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Although holding that Rule 407 could be used to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial
measures taken after the plaintiffs accident, Posner's literalist opinion favored the plaintiff in many respects. Id.
Evidence of the defendant's decision to make the remedial measure was admissible because it predated the
accident. Id. Therefore, "the incremental evidentiary impact of the fact that the decision was carried out is
unlikely to be great." Id. Presumably, most defendants confronted with the Kaczmarek decision would prefer
evidence of their subsequent remedial measure to be admitted because once the jury knows of the decision to
make the measure, there is little to gain from hiding evidence that the remedial measure was implemented. Id.
See also In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 529 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that Rule 407 excludes evidence of
a subsequent remedial measure by a defendant even when the evidence is offered by the defendant who took the
measure in order to prove the culpability of an adversary). "Courts have been wary to restrict the scope of Rule
407. We should not be too quick to read new exceptions into the rule because by doing so there is a danger of
subverting the policy underlying the rule." Id.
96. Van Gordon v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 693 P.2d 1285, 1289 (Or. 1985).
97. Id. at 1289.
98. Kaczmarek, 836 F.2d at 1060.
99. Id.
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B. Solution #2-The Policy Approach
The second possible resolution to the temporal problem of subsequent
remedial measures is to focus on the safety policy underlying Rule 407. The
Supreme Court of Iowa employed a policy-centric approach in Doe v.
Johnston.'°° Doe involved a medical malpractice action based on the plaintiff
contracting AIDS from a tainted blood transfusion.' The patient, a fifty-year-old
unidentified man, underwent a total hip replacement performed by the defendant,
Dr. Johnston, in February 1985. '0' As part of the plaintiff's post-operative
recovery, Dr. Johnston ordered a blood transfusion.' 3 Two years later, the
plaintiff learned the donor of the transfused blood carried HIV, and subsequent
tests confirmed the plaintiff had acquired the disease.'" The lawsuit centered
around whether the transfusion was medically necessary and whether Dr.
Johnston "breached the standard of medical care by failing to warn [the plaintiff]
of the risk of acquiring AIDS through blood transfusion or, in the alternative,
failing to5 advise him of the possibility of self-donating the necessary units of
0
blood."'
At trial, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence that in early 1986, Dr.
Johnston began informing his patients about the risk of AIDS from blood
transfusions and the advisability of self-donating. ' 6 Dr. Johnston argued that the
evidence should be excluded under Iowa's subsequent remedial measures rule
because the plaintiff's procedure occurred in 1985. o The trial court agreed with
Dr. Johnston and interpreted Iowa Rule of Evidence 407'08 literally so as to apply
whenever the remedial measure is taken after the "event."' 0 9 Although the
plaintiff argued the "event" was the doctor learning of the injury, the trial court
determined the "event" was the blood transfusion."
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court took a policy-oriented approach to
resolve the issue."' Justice Neuman, writing for the court, stated that "the policy
behind the rule, which is to encourage people to take steps to increase public
safety... would not be served if evidence of defendants' changed behavior could

100.
101.

Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa 1991).
Id.at 30.

102.

Id.

103.

Id.

104.

Id.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 33.
107. Id.
108. Iowa Rule of Evidence 407 reads, in pertinent part:
"When, after an event, measures are taken
which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event." IOWA R. EVID 407.
109. Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 33.
110.

Id.

111.

Id.
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be used to prove liability just because defendant was unaware that any injury or
accident had occurred."" 2 Thus, "the policy underlying the rule should apply not
only when the safety measures are taken in reaction to an accident,
but also when
' 3
they are taken merely upon discovery that change is needed." "
Almost as an afterthought, the court also held that a plain reading of the rule
made the triggering event "the same as the act giving rise to [the claim of]
negligence.""' Although not discussed in Doe v. Johnston, a more careful
analysis of the policies behind the doctrine of subsequent remedial measures
further supports its application where the measure is taken after the event causing
the plaintiff's injury, rather than after the plaintiff's injury occurs."'
V. LITERALIST VS. POLICY APPROACHES: GUIDANCE FROM THIRD PARTY
MEASURES AND POST-ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

The question of whether to apply Rule 407 to bar evidence of measures taken
before a defendant has knowledge of a plaintiff's injury can be informed by the
debate over whether the doctrine of subsequent remedial measures applies to
measures taken by third parties and to post-accident investigations. In all of these
situations, potential conflicts between a literal reading of Rule 407 and its
underlying policies threaten to upset the certainty of outcome the rule was
designed to create.
Most courts considering the third party issue hold that Rule 407 does not
exclude subsequent remedial measures made by someone other than the
defendant." 6 But at least one court has noted that Rule 407 is written in the
passive voice, excluding evidence "when measures are taken that.., would have
made the injury or harm less likely" and does not expressly limit the exclusion to
cases where the defendant made the remedial measure."17 Nonetheless, majorityrule courts point to two factors buttressing their argument.
First, these courts note that Rule 407 was implemented so defendants would
not be discouraged from improving the safety of their products or premises for
fear it would be used against them in court." 8 Because the person performing the

112. Id. at 34 (citing Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 881 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1987)).
113. Id. (citing Petree, 881 F.2d at 1198). It is important to note that Doe was decided before the 1997
amendment to the federal rule, which changed the applicable time from an "event" to "after an injury or harm
allegedly caused by an event." See FED. R. EVID. 407.
114. Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 34.
115. See infra Part VI.C.
116. See, e.g., Mehojah v. Drummond, 56 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 1995); TLT-Babcock, Inc. v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 33 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1994); Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 888
(9th Cir. 1991); O'Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1204 (8th Cir. 1990); Dixon v. Int'l Harvester Co., 754
F.2d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 1985); Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Wiedemann
Mach. Co., 280 F.2d 380, 382 (3rd Cir. 1960).
117. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14373, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2000).
118. See, e.g., TLT-Babcock, Inc., 33 F.3d at 400; Pau, 928 F.2d at 888.
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remedial measure is not a defendant, there is no risk the measure will be used
against the third party and, accordingly, there is no need to protect the incentives
to make the improvement."' 9 In other words, someone who is not a defendant and
will not become a defendant has no need to be protected by Rule 407. Further,
someone who is not now a defendant, but fears becoming one in the future, has
an incentive to undertake a subsequent remedial measure because a plaintiff may
decide at trial that it is more important to introduce evidence
of the remedial
20
measure than to name the marginal defendant to the case.1
Second, the majority-rule courts cite Rule 407's Advisory Committee Notes
to justify their position that subsequent remedial measures by third parties are
admissible.'2 ' The Notes state that "[t]he rule incorporates conventional doctrine
which excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures as proof of an
admission of fault.' 2 2 Logically, these cases reason, fault cannot be "admitted" at
trial by someone who is not a party; therefore, evidence of subsequent remedial
measures by a non-party cannot be an admission of fault. 23 Thus, Rule 407 does
not require evidence of subsequent remedial measures by non-defendants be
excluded. 2 4 In addition, the Advisory Committee was already aware of courts'
interpretations of the rule when the 1997 amendments to Rule 407 were made.
Therefore,25 the Advisory Committee has tacitly approved the majority's
position.'
Thus, a majority of courts addressing whether Rule 407 extends to remedial
measures by non-defendants have abandoned a literal interpretation of the text in
favor of reading the rule to fit the policy of encouraging (or at least not
discouraging) subsequent repairs.' 26 Furthermore, in justifying their decisions,
these courts either do not or cannot rely on the policy reasons based on such
measures being irrelevant or unduly prejudicial.' 27 Rather, the only policy

119. For similar reasons, courts have admitted evidence of government mandated subsequent remedial
measures, holding that exclusion of evidence under Rule 407 is only required to protect defendants' incentives
to make voluntary remedial measures. See O'Dell, 904 F.2d at 1194.
120. Because plaintiffs may "defendant shop" so as to ensure that evidence of the remedial measure is
admissible, some have questioned whether the rule should also exclude evidence of subsequent remedial
measures by "potential defendants." See Mehojah, 56 F.3d at 1216-17 (McKay, J., dissenting) ("Plaintiffs could
choose to sue only some potential defendants in order to have evidence of other potential defendants'
subsequent remedial measures admitted. This would contravene the public policy embodied in Rule 407.").
121. Diehl v. Blaw-Knox, 360 F.3d 426, 430 (3rd Cir. 2004).
122. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (1975); see also Diehl, 360 F.3d at 430.
123. Diehl, 360 F.3d at 430.
124. See Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1524 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhere is no rationale for
excluding third party subsequent repairs under the Rule.").
125. Diehl, 360 F.3d at 430.
126. Pennsylvania has adopted a rule specifically limiting the application of the doctrine of subsequent
remedial measures to measures undertaken by a defendant. See PA. R. EVID. 407.
127. In another sense, however, it is difficult to see how evidence of a subsequent remedial measure by a
non-defendant is any more relevant than evidence of a subsequent remedial measure by a defendant. Indeed, it
is likely to be more prejudicial as the jury only sees that someone else had to pick up the slack in the wake of
the defendant's negligence, culpable conduct, or defective product.
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justification is that one should not be discouraged from taking remedial 28measures
for fear of it being used in a later court proceeding to prove negligence.
From this discussion it might appear that applying a policy-based approach to
the temporal problem is reasonable given the similarities between it and the third
party situation. However, there is one key distinction between them. Rule 407
does not define, anywhere, who must take the measure for it to be inadmissible.
In relevant part, the rule simply states, "When, after an injury or harm allegedly
caused by an event, measures are taken . ,,29 While not a stretch to argue that
failing to use limiting language means the rule applies to any measure, no matter
who took it, this is a more tenuous argument than can be made to the temporal
problem. While Rule 407 does not say by whom the measure must be taken, it
does partially answer the temporal question by limiting its application to
measures taken "after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event."' 3 ° As a
result, while policy arguments may be useful in allowing courts to interpolate an
exception permitting the admission of remedial measures taken by third parties, it
is more difficult to justify deviating from a plain reading of Rule 407 when
deciding whether a defendant must have notice of the plaintiff s injury.
The position that courts should interpret Rule 407 so that the rule best
adheres to the policy of encouraging people to take safety precautions is further
undermined by the majority literalist approach used in another Rule 407
situation-the admission of defendants' post-accident investigations and reports.
Here, a slim majority of jurisdictions hold that evidence of post-accident investigations and reports are admissible under Rule 407 because, "by themselves, postaccident investigations would not make the event 'less likely to occur;' only the
actual implemented changes make it so."' ' 31 Moreover, read literally, Rule 407
requires that the measure could have been taken before the accident, while
accident investigations cannot occur before an accident.'3 2 From a policy
standpoint, admitting evidence of investigations and reports has a chilling effect
on a would-be defendants' incentives to investigate and determine what remedial
measures might be appropriate to increase product safety.133 Still, only a minority

128. This policy has been both widely cited and emphatically criticized. See infra text accompanying
notes 139-42; see also Blanton, supra note 13, at 60 (citing commentators critical of this policy justification).
129. FED. R. EvID. 407 (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. Brazos River Auth. v. GE Ionics, Inc., 469 F.3d 416, 430 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Prentiss &
Carlisle Co. v. Koehring-Waterous Div. of Timberjack, Inc., 972 F.2d 6, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1992) (following a
literalist approach in admitting evidence of post-accident "stress tests"); Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp.,
687 F. Supp. 482, 486-87 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (admitting evidence of post-event tests); Ensign v. Marion County,
914 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (following a literalist approach for accident reports).
132. Brazos River Auth., 469 F.3d at428 (following a literalist approach regarding subsequent measures
taken to improve products subject to breach of warranty claims because "the admission of evidence of changes
made merely to improve a product, as distinguished from remedial measures that make an 'injury or harm less
likely to occur,' is not barred by the rule").
133. Id.at 30.
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of courts follow this policy approach and exclude such evidence.'3 4 Thus, despite
the additional safety that could be afforded to the public by applying Rule 407 to
post-accident investigations, most courts have adhered to the literal text of Rule
407 and have refused to allow the policy to overtake the text.
VI. THE SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION AND AMENDMENT

Given the foregoing analysis, how should courts interpret Rule 407 when
presented with the question of the admissibility of a defendant's subsequent
remedial measures taken without knowledge of the plaintiff's injury? Two
options-the policy approach and the textual approach-are set forth and
explored below. This article also provides a suggested amendment to Rule 407
that will further its underlying policy goals.
A.

Option #1-The Policy Approach

The first option for determining Rule 407's applicability in the context of the
unknowing defendant problem is a policy-based approach. Under this approach, a
court would examine the underlying policies of Rule 407 and base the
admissibility of the evidence on whether these policies would be furthered. As
previously explained, three policies justify the exclusion of subsequent remedial
measures.'35 The first is relevance. However, reliance on relevance should be
greatly discounted, if not completely ignored, for three reasons. First, the36
Advisory Committee specifically states this is a weak justification for the rule.
Second, relevance is not used in the context of subsequent remedial measures by
third parties, which has a greater need for reliance on policy considerations.'37
Third, and most importantly, there is no reason to believe that the introduction of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken before knowledge of a
plaintiff's injury is any more relevant than measures taken after knowledge of the
injury. For these reasons, the relevancy policy does not provide much guidance in
analyzing Rule 407's applicability to the unknowing defendant problem.
The next justification for a policy-based approach is that Rule 407 serves the
function of precluding the admission of evidence that is more prejudicial than
probative. 8 However, this is illusory as Rule 403 already fully addresses this
problem. 1
The final justification is that Rule 407 is used to encourage, or at least not to
discourage, individuals from taking steps in furtherance of added safety. This

134. See id. (citing Alimenta v. Stauffer, 598 F. Supp. 934, 940 (N.D. Ga. 1984)); Martel v. Mass. Bay
Transp. Auth., 525 N.E.2d 662, 664 (Mass. 1988).
135. See supra Part I1.
136. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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justification has been highly criticized. As commentators have noted, "[t]here is
only skimpy evidence that tort defendants behave in the way that this argument
supposes."' 39 In D.L. v. Huebner, the Wisconsin Supreme Court critiqued this
policy justification as having "little, if any, basis in reality."' ° The court noted
there was "no empirical evidence that persons are aware of this evidentiary rule
or that their actions are in any way affected by its existence.""'4 The court further
pointed out that "[a] person would probably prefer to correct a defect (even if
evidence of this remedial action is admitted to prove negligence) rather than
expose many other members of the public to similar injuries and thus face
numerous lawsuits arising out of each of these injuries.' 4 2 Without empirical
research to determine whether individuals are encouraged to take additional steps
to ensure safety because of Rule 407, it is unclear whether this third policy
justification holds true. At best, we can only say this justification does not clearly
support the admissibility or exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures taken by defendants without knowledge of the plaintiff's injury.
In short, when confronted with the unknowing defendant situation, the
justifications for a policy-based approach to analyzing Rule 407 are weak. The
underlying policies are not furthered and they do not strongly favor admissibility
or exclusion of such evidence. Instead, as described below, a strict literalist
approach may be better suited for the analysis.
B. Option #2-The Textual Approach
The second option for determining Rule 407's applicability in the context of
the unknowing defendant problem is a textual approach. Under this approach, a
court would examine only the text of Rule 407 and would base the admissibility
of the evidence on the text, without determining if the policies underlying Rule
407 are furthered. As explained above, the policy approach is weak, and at best,
unclear. 43 In contrast, a textual approach is more solidly based and because the
policy bases are not examined, it is not subject to the critiques that weaken and
muddy the policy approach. Moreover, the textual approach has been utilized by
courts in the post-accident investigation context which, like the unknowing
defendant problem, could further safety policies if applied, notwithstanding the
text of Rule 407.' "

139.

140.
141.
142.
California's

WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5282.

D.L. v. Huebner, 329 N.W.2d 890, 902 (Wis. 1983).
Id.
Id.; see also Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1974) (rejecting application of
version of Rule 407 in strict liability cases).

143.

See supra Part VIA.

144.

See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
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C. A ProposedAmendment
Although we favor the textual approach for applying Rule 407 when the
defendant is without knowledge of the plaintiff's injury, amending the rule as
described below could more clearly resolve the temporal problem of subsequent
remedial measures. Moreover, an amendment would also further the underlying
policies adhered to by proponents of the doctrine. The suggested amendment is
minor and simply blends the pre-1997 and post-1997 rules. The suggested
language for Federal Rule of Evidence 407 reads:
When after an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would
have made the injury or harm allegedly caused by the event less likely to
occur, evidence of subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a
product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or
feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
This amendment maintains the current Rule 407's applicability to strict
liability claims, but the first sentence is changed from excluding evidence of
subsequent remedial measures taken "after an injury or harm allegedly caused by
an event" to the pre-1997 Amendment language of "after an event.' ' 45 The
purpose of this change is to define the applicable time period for undertaking
subsequent remedial measures as after the potential cause of injury exists (i.e.,
the defendant's negligent act or manufacture of a defective product), rather than
after someone is injured. A strict reading of the rule in conjunction with our
amendment advances the underlying policies of Rule 407.46
If Rule 407 is about relevance, then our proposed amendment makes
sense. The relevancy argument is that additional safety measures fail to shed any
light on whether a defendant was or was not negligent or whether a product was
or was not defective. 147 There is no reason why safety measures taken after the
potential cause of injury exists, but before the injury takes place, are any more
relevant to show negligence or product defectiveness than safety measures taken
after the injury occurred. The rationale of Morse is no less applicable.4 8 In fact,
the time period set forth in Morse-after the occurrence of an injury-is underinclusive to the extent if fails to capture remedial measures taken after the
defendant's negligent act but before the plaintiff s injury.
145.

Compare FED. R. EVID. 407 (1975), with FED. R. EvID. 407 (2006).

146. Because Rule 403 adequately covers the potential for prejudice to outweigh the probative value of
subsequent remedial measures and is, in reality, not a policy basis for Rule 407 at all, this "policy" concern will
not be addressed. See supra notes 63-64 and text accompanying note 138.
147. See Morse v. Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1883).
148.

Id.
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Perhaps amending the first sentence of Rule 407 back to its pre-1997
language would change nothing because some pre-1997 court decisions only
applied the rule to measures taken after accidents occurred. However, it must be
remembered that the amendment works in conjunction with the strict literalist
application of Rule 407.149 When read literally, courts should apply the rule to
measures taken after potential causes of injuries exist because the creation of a
source of injury can be read into a broad interpretation of "event." But to assist
those judges who continue to look outside the text of the rule for enlightenment
on what the "event" is, the Advisory Committee Notes, or even the rule itself,
should also be amended to reflect that the term "event" is meant to be broadly
construed to include the existence of a potential cause of an injury.
However, as discussed above, the relevancy justification is not the strongest
reason for Rule 407.150 Historically, the strongest support for Rule 407 has been
predicated on increasing, or at least not decreasing, safety.' 5 If Rule 407 is truly
about promoting safety, then the current version of Rule 407 furthers that aim in
most instances. But when the defendant takes the remedial measures without
knowledge of the plaintiffs injury, it is, at best, unclear whether admitting this
evidence undermines the safety policy.
Adopting the proposed amendment and reading the rule in a strict-literalist
sense either furthers, or at least does not harm, the safety policy. As described
above, reading the suggested amendment in a strict-literalist sense (and supported
by the proposed amendment to the Advisory Committee Notes) would cause
measures taken after the potential cause of injuries exists to be excluded from
evidence. If, as the policy argument goes, defendants will take steps to make their
products or premises safer when the threat that their actions will come back to
haunt them later in court is extinguished, then it follows that excluding the same
evidence at any point after a dangerous condition exists would encourage, or at
least not discourage, defendants from taking additional precautionary measures.
Although it is not clear that the proposed amendment and the adoption of a strictliteralist analysis of Rule 407 would ensure an increase in safety measures, it
undoubtedly provides more incentive for doing so than the current rule.
Regardless of whether one subscribes to a literalist approach, a policy
approach, or a combination thereof, the proposed amendment furthers both. If the
rule is to remain, then its underlying policies should be effectuated at least in
theory, if not in practice. The current version of Rule 407, and the methods in
which courts5 2 interpret it, does not fully accomplish this task-additional changes
are needed.

149. See supra Part VI.B.
150. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note (1975).
151. See supra notes 39, 42, 59-61 and accompanying text.
152. It is important to note that most states did not amend their version of Rule 407 to reflect the 1997
Amendment changing the relevant time period from an "after an event" to "after an injury or harm allegedly
caused by an event." These states could, but would not need to, amend their rules of evidence; their courts
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D. Application of the ProposedAmendment
By way of example, assume a manufacturer of industrial equipment creates a
new machine and sells it on January 1, 2008. On June 1, 2008, someone is
injured while working with the machine. On August 1, 2008, the manufacturer,
without knowledge of the June 1 accident, adds a guard to the machine which, if
used in the original design, would have prevented the worker's accident. The
injured worker then files suit. In this hypothetical, a court would be presented
with the following question: Is the manufacturer's addition of a guard to the
machine on August 1, two months after the plaintiff's June 1 injury but before
learning of the injury, admissible to prove the manufacturer was negligent or that
the machine was defective?' Applying the proposed amendment to Rule 407 and
using a strict-literalist interpretation, a court would first determine when the
"event" took place. As discussed, the "event" is interpreted broadly to include
when the potential cause of injuries existed. In the hypothetical, the potential
cause of the injury is the manufacture of the machine without a guard and this
existed on January 1. Thus, any measures taken after January 1 that would have
made the injury or harm less likely to occur would be inadmissible to prove
negligence or a product defect. Because the manufacturer added a guard to the
machine subsequent to January 1, and adding a guard would have prevented the
plaintiffs injury, the evidence is inadmissible unless used for another purpose.
From a policy perspective, application of the proposed amendment makes
sense. With respect to relevance, the manufacturer's addition of a guard does not
show it was negligent at the time of manufacture nor does it show the machine
was defective at the time of manufacture. For all we know, the manufacturer
exercised all due care on January 1 when the machine was manufactured.
Alternatively, the manufacturer could have fallen short of meeting the standard of
care imposed by the law. In terms of defectiveness, the state of the art for the
machine could not have included the guard until August 1 when the manufacturer
promptly complied and caused the product to conform. Alternatively, these type
of injuries could have been well known to result from machines without guards
and all other manufacturers could have included guards on their machines. The
point is that introduction of the manufacturer's addition of the guard into
evidence neither favors or disfavors negligence or defectiveness. After learning
of these underlying facts, one may conclude that adding the guard confirmed that
the manufacturer was negligent or the product was defective, but the introduction
of the addition of the guard into evidence is not what ultimately proved
negligence or defectiveness; the additional facts already performed this task. The

would only have to adopt a strict-literalist approach to interpreting the already-existing rule. But see DEL. R.
EvID. 407; FLA. STAT. ch. § 90.407; IDAHO R. EvID. 407; ME. R. EVID. 407; MINN. R. EVID. 407; N.D. R. EvD.
407; OHIO R. EvID. 407; 42 PA. R. EvID. 407; TEx. R. EviD. 407; UTAH R. EVID. 407; VT. R. EVID. 407. These

states define the relevant time period as after the injury or harm.
153. See supra Part I.
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introduction of subsequent remedial measures adds nothing probative in and of
itself.
The stronger safety policy argument is also furthered, or at least not
hindered, in the hypothetical. Because safety measures taken after the machine
was manufactured on January 1 were inadmissible, the manufacturer had an
incentive to add the guard at any point after this date, or at least was not
discouraged from adding a guard at any point after January 1. At best, the
manufacturer would have added the guard on January 2 and prevented the
plaintiff's injuries. Here, the safety policy argument is a complete success. At
worst, the manufacturer never adds a guard, the law of negligence and strict
liability operates in the absence of Rule 407, and the safety policy is neither
advanced nor harmed. Between these two extremes lies a situation where the
manufacturer adds a guard on August 1. The plaintiff is already injured, so the
safety policy is not furthered as applied to the plaintiff, but just as in the case
where the manufacturer never adds a guard, the safety policy is neither advanced
nor hindered. However, the addition of the guard on August 1 might have saved
another person from being injured on August 2, or another on October 15, or
another on November 12. These other injuries would not have been prevented if
the manufacturer waited until December 1, when it learned of the plaintiffs
injury, to add the guard. It may never be known whether the manufacturer's
decision to add the guard was influenced by its knowledge of Rule 407, but
admitting evidence of the addition of the guard to prove negligence or
defectiveness is a limiting rule erring on the side of reduced safety rather than
erring on the side of increased safety. Because our amendment would bar this
evidence, it promotes the potential for increased safety.
VII. CONCLUSION
The question raised by this article is whether Rule 407 applies when a
defendant is without knowledge of a plaintiffs injuries but remedies an unsafe
situation nonetheless. 54 The text of Rule 407 is silent on a defendant's
knowledge, but at least one court has superimposed knowledge as a requirement
for the rule to be applicable. 1 5 This interpretation of Rule 407 is based on a loose
textual reading of the rule.' 56 A better-reasoned reading of Rule 407 is a strictliteralist interpretation that does not require the defendant to have knowledge of
the plaintiff's injury. 157 This strict-literalist reading not only more closely follows
the text of Rule 407, it also furthers the policies underlying the rule by limiting

154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra Parts I and IV.
Van Gordon v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 693 P.2d 1285, 1289 (Or. 1985).
See supra Part IV.A (critiquing the Oregon Supreme Court's "literal" reading in Van Gordon).
See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
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irrelevant or unduly prejudicial evidence from being introduced at trial and
providing an atmosphere for increased safety. 5 8
Although adoption of a strict-textualist reading of Rule 407 would solve the
differing interpretations facing courts presented with this question, more can be
done to further the purpose of Rule 407.59 Amending Rule 407 to define the
pertinent time period as after an injury-causing source exists strengthens the
relevancy and public safety policy bases for the rule.' 6°
The current version of Rule 407 and the varying interpretations of how it
applies leave this evidentiary rule without a solid foundation and causes
uncertainty and confusion for product manufacturers and owner of premises. A
minor amendment in conjunction with a choice by courts to strictly read the text
of Rule 407 would solve these problems. And, if the public safety rationale for
the rule is true-that product manufacturers and premises owners will be
forthcoming in taking additional safety measures-then this amendment will also
better serve the public by removing dangerous conditions before more people are
injured.
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See supra Part VI.C.
See supra Parts VI.C-D.
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